CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 259

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but it would not be wise to say so publicly at present. The draft

statement attached to his memorandum, to which certain minor amendments

had subsequently been circulated, was designed with this problem in mind.

Meanwhile the process of our military withdrawal, which had previously been agreed and announced in the Defence White Papers of 1966 (Cmnd. 2901), and 1967 (Cmnd. 3357), continued. Large quantities of stores had been evacuated, but every successive stage of our withdrawal

involved increasingly great risks in view of the diminution of our forces

and the smaller area which they were in a position to control. The

stage of the greatest danger would be when we had to hand over the Crater chisticer

6/9/67 of Aden, since our remaining troops and the airfield at Khormaksar would

then be within mortar range of the terrorists. The latter had large

quantities of arms and while we must hope to be able to negotiate the

formation of an effective government, we could not control the situation;

effective administration might disintegrate and the situation

become wholly chaotic. In these circumstances it was of vital importance

that there should be full accord between the High Commissioner and the

British civil staff on the one hand and between the General Officer

Commanding and the British forces on the other as the policy to be

pursued in South Arabia. The General Officer Commanding had accordingly

discussed the proposed policy with all his senior officers down to and

including battalion commanders and all were fully in accord with it,

TO

s/th

In discussion it was argued that the policy proposed involved

serious risk to our position in Bahrain and Sharjah, the early liquidation

of British military power in the Middle East and the abandonment of those

in South Arabia who had committed themselves to our cause.

It was, however, the general view of the Committee that not only could there be

y question at this stage of changing the Government's policy of

withdrawal from South Arabia but that our longer term interests would best be served by the gradual withdrawal at appropriate stages of our

military presence in the Middle East. The risks to our presence in the

Persian Gulf arising from the present situation in South Arabia must be

accepted: we should maintain our present position in the former area and

it was too soon to form a view on the duration of our military presence

there. As regards South Arabia itself the present situation, however deplorable in the disorder and the loss of life which was involved, at

no

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